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Abstract. A static analysis techniques were combined with model-based deductive verification using solvers of the 
static model theory (SMT) to create a framework that, given an aspect of analysis of the source code, automatically 
generated with an analyzer outputting a conclusion information about this aspect. The analyzer is generated by 
translating of a program collecting semantic to outlined formula in first order over a few multiple submitted theories. 
The underscore can be looked as some set of holes or contexts corresponding to the uninterpreted APIs invoked in the 
program. As the program makes an import of the packages and uses classes’ methods of these packages, it is importing 
the semantics of API invocations in first order assertion. The analyzer is using these assertions as models and their first 
logic order formula incorporates the specification behavior (its negation) of the described programs. A solver of SMT-
LIB formula is treated as the combined formula for “constrain” and “solve” it. The “solved” form can be used for 
logic errors (security) identification Android-based Java-programs. The properties of Android security are represented 
as constraint and analysis aims to show the respecting for these constraints. 
Keywords: Android security; Java-program; static analysis; static model theory; program code. 
 
1. Introduction 
Software systems stencily manage mission-critical 
activities in organizations which rely on dependable, 
situation award and delivered in time classified or 
sensitive information. Information streams in such 
organizations are usually machined by common-
built, with open source code, and traditionally 
cooperated security software. Such programs may be 
unlicensed with malicious code or vulnerability 
containing, which can be used for insider or outsider 
to seize a confidential data, reclassify documents, 
make some destroyed actions, and modify valuable 
information. So, the reliability and correct work of 
described above software to drive these systems 
have become important issues for today. 
Program-independed errors in software systems 
like overflows of buffer or null dereferences can be 
used by malicious applications to make unsecured 
holes, through which unsecured confidential data 
can be captured. Most of these bugs are detected too 
late, when destructive effects are already appeared 
[1] complicating the task of runtime preceding 
mechanisms of fault handling for ensuring data 
recovery. A more important is the lack of peculiar 
tools for logical dependencies of program-depended 
errors detecting in applications. A testing of a well-
known incident list resulting from software glitches 
opens that logical application-depended errors were 
the causes in [2,3] works. A lot of these logical 
faults were hard and difficult to reveal (opposite to 
simple errors) with using observed testing methods 
[4] alone. 
In this paper we combine the static analysis 
techniques with model-based deductive verification 
using solvers of the static model theory (SMT) to 
create a framework that, given an aspect of analysis 
of the source code, automatically generated with an 
analyzer outputting the conclusion information about 
this aspect. The analyzer is generated by program 
translation for collecting semantic to outlined 
formula in first logic order over a few multiple 
submitted theories. The underscore can be looked as 
some set of holes or contexts corresponding to the 
uninterpreted APIs invoked in the program. As the 
program makes an import of the packages and uses 
classes’ methods of those packages, it is importing 
the semantics of API invocations in first order 
assertion. The analyzer is using these assertions as 
models and their first logic order formula 
incorporates the specification behavior (its negation) 




of the described programs. A solver of SMT-LIB 
formula is treated as the combined formula for 
“constrain” and “solve” it. The “solved” form can be 
used for logic errors (security) identification of 
Android-based Java-programs. The properties of 
Android security are represented as constraint and 
analysis aims to show the respecting for these 
constraints 
2. Related works 
Software verification and validation techniques for 
software can be divided in three categories. The first 
one includes informal methods such as testing and 
monitoring. These techniques are scaling well by the 
most used technique in practice to validate software 
systems. The testing accounts for forty to sixty 
percent for efforts of developments [4, 5]. The 
traditional methods for software program testing [6], 
however, do not allow for formal specification and 
verification of high logical properties that need to 
satisfy the system. In the area of security critical 
software where exponential goes up in the number 
of possible situations to be dealt is inevitable, 
traditional testing methods can be with difficulty 
used to provide some confidence level. The second 
category of methods for software verification and 
validation includes traditional formal methods such 
as verification model and providing of theorems are 
sometimes too heavy and rarely can be used in 
practice without considerable manual work.  
Checking of the model includes an automatic 
approach for verification more successful while 
dealing with finite state systems. It suffers not only 
from infamous state explosions problem but it also 
need the model performance for program software.  
Third method category for program software 
verification and validation is settled on static 
analysis techniques and abstract interpretation [7,8]. 
The static analysis refers to automatic displaying 
behavior technique for programs during the time of 
compiling. While static analysis tools have touched 
with a great practical success, and have been 
integrated with state of the newer compilers, such 
tools can reveal only small and simple errors due to 
the lack of their deductive strength. So, traditional 
tools of static analysis cannot reveal a deadlock 
presence or the violation of common exclusion in 
concurred programs. The abstract interpretation is a 
technique for the program semantic collection, 
comparison and combination. It successfully has 
been used for inferring of program runtime 
properties that may be used for program 
optimization. On the next the most successful 
approaches for program analysis are reviewed. In the 
last years a lot of work has been made in the area of 
software static analysis. Some tools of static 
analysis, such as described in articles [9-14] are 
making lightweight analysis of data flow. In the [15] 
conference article the data flow analysis is provided 
for verification, described in "metalanguage", 
designed for checking ″automata″ encoding. Astree 
is a static program analyzer directed to confirm the 
runtime error absence in the installed programs, and 
can handle only "safe" C-subset rather than all  
C-language. It concerns only for separate runtime 
errors but general program properties. In [16] the 
linear relation analysis is used to reveal invariant 
linear inequalities numerical program variables. 
Their methods have been used for verify (analyze 
delays) in synchronous programs written in "Lustre-
language". A few technique approaches have been 
considered to provide an approximate answer to the 
validation problem as enlargement, convex 
approximations and factoring of Cartesian [17]. 
These approximations are realized with using of part 
of polyhedral library. In the article [18] the predicate 
abstraction is used to analyze hybrid systems. In this 
method the finite abstraction of hybrid automated 
system is creating with priory using initial predicates 
taken of the user. 
3. Android platform 
Android is the software to develop mobile devices. It 
includes an operating system, key applications and 
middle-connection software. The main feature of the 
Android is that an application can use elements of 
other programs. To rich this, the system has to start the 
process when any of the other programs part is need. 
Android has no any single point of entrance like 
function main(). They have essential components, 
which the system can instantiate and start if necessary. 
There are four main component types: activity, 
services, audio receivers and connect providers.  
Android has an aim to active the first three 
components. For activities and services, the intent is 
the pair: <action_name, data>, to display the previous 
action, which receiver has to except and data to 
process. In the framework of the represented program 
analysis this aimed object is keyword used to make 
data flow analysis and call of analysis function.  
Android-architecture provides created applications 
with phone functions and protects users to minimize 
mistake consequences and harmful software. As it was 
said, in Android an application may exchange its data 




and functionality with other software, and these 
accesses have to be controlled carefully to provide the 
security. Android permissions are rights given to 
programs to perform such functions like photocopy, 
GPS using and phone call making. When applications 
are installing, they accept the unique identifier UID, 
and every application always runs under its name with 
the particle appointed device. Application UID is using 
for protection its data exchange with other 
applications. 
4. Model architecture 
Fig. 1 shows architecture of static analysis 
proposed on the model basis. The abstract collecting 
semantic of Java-program are represented as 
"marked" coercions. "Marked" can be considered as 
a set of holes and contexts corresponding to no 
interpreted APIs, i.e. API from library with 
unknown semantics. As program imports the 
packages and uses classes’ methods in imported 
packages, the semantics of API invocations are 
importing here as first order assertions (constraints). 
These assertions are models used to "unmark" 
constraints of the abstract collecting semantics i.e. 
for "fill in" uninterpreted APIs "holes". Aspects of 
analysis are specifying as constraints. 
 
Fig. 1. Model architecture 
The solving of the basic constraint is done by 
using of decision procedures combination provided 
by (Yices) constraint solver [19]. The key steps 
involved in the workframe of the analysis are 1) 
permission verification of the Android APIs, 
invoked in the Java code, based on Manifest.xml. 
The verification results of permission are using for 
model APIs modification, 2) generate abstract 
collecting semantics constraints from the Java code, 
3) import models of uninterpreted methods and 
objects as assertions into already generated 
constraints; uninterpreted methods and/or objects 
have to be annotated by the developer; annotation is 
necessary from the moment since the particular 
method can be changed of the programmer and 
importing its “conventional” model from a model 
library may result the analysis unsoundness, 4) 
generate an analyzer by adding “aspect” constraints 
of the appropriate analysis, 5) Analyze by the 
constraint solving. 
А. Verification of the permission 
Android permissions can be separated into 
different security levels [20, 21], which are defined 
in the Mainifest.xml file. The framework examines 
this file and reveals permission information. The 
necessary list of permissions should be formed from 
analyzing of APIs invoked in the program and can 
be compared with permission information P taken 
from file Mainifest.xml. The android API calls can 
be mapped with necessary permission list used in 
[22]. If the every permission is provided we 
conclude that application has no permission 
violations. Otherwise, API calls which have no 
provided appropriate permissions will be considered 
as with return of -1 in the following analysis. 
В. Constraints, solvers of SMT-LIB formula, 
satisfiability 
Constraints are special formulas in first logic order 
[23], and a constraint system itself specifies the 
syntax and constraints semantics. The solver of the 
constraint implements a checking algorithm to verify 
the satisfiability/consistency of constraint sets using 
constraint theory, i.e., revealing if there exists a 
variable assignment that satisfies the constraints. A 
solver uses constraint theory axioms together with 
simplification rules as rewritten rules for the 
constraints transforming to a normal form which is 
called the "solved" form. The last constraint which 
results from the computation will be named the 
answer.  
С. SMT-LIB formulas and Yices 
Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) libraries 
(SMT-LIB) [24] provide a framework for the first 
order formulas satisfiability checking in agreement 
with some background logical theories. SMT 
provides background theories standard description 
used in SMT systems. It gives a common input and 
output languages for SMT formula solvers. "Yices" 
described in [19] is effective SMT-LIB formula 
solver, that decides the arbitrary formulas 
satisfiability containing uninterpreted function 
symbols with equality, linear real and integer 




arithmetic, scalar types, recursive data types, tipples, 
records, extensional arrays, fixed bit-vectors, lambda 
expressions, and quantifiers.  
5. Java programs inferring collecting semantics 
We have to perform intraprocedural and 
interprocedural analysis to analyze deep logical 
properties of Java-based programs. Using data flow 
analysis of the source code in intraprocedural 
analysis, in a series of steps is built a constraint 
system for capturing its collecting semantics. In the 
way of the interprocedural analysis the call graph 
has to be built and some external rules have to be 
defined for relating the different API invocations 
and detecting if the analyzed code breaks these rules.  
In the analysis framework the following 
sequence of steps (SSA) has to be followed to check 
if the program satisfies an analysis aspect defined of 
the user. 1) The dataflow analysis of the Java source 
code has to be performed and its collecting semantic 
has to be generated, 2) The static single assignment 
[25] graph of the program, based on the dataflow 
analysis results, has to be generated, 3) The SSA 
graph has to be convert to the SMT-LIB formulas 
(see below), 4) On the last step the models of 
uninterpreted API invocations have to be imported 
as first order assertions.  
The above steps can be illustrated in the 
following code:  
1 class udhpcd 
2 { 
3        int getSocket (int listen_mode) 
         { 
5                int fd = 0; 
6                if(listen_mode == 2) { 
8                     fd = listen_socket(); 
9                }  
10             else { 
12                   fd = raw_socket() ; 
13             }  
14       }  
15 } 
In the program shown above listen_mode is the 
input of the user, listen_socket() is a return method 
with positive integer, raw_socket() is a method, 
providing of operated system, due to return specific 
positive integer. Provided data flow analysis of the 
source code is shown in fig 2. The integer number in 
the graph of the data flow indicates the code line 
number of each statement. 
 
Fig. 2. Flow of Data 
After line 12 the variable value fd can be as 
return value of listen_socket() or raw_socket(), 
because the above program has two branches. 
During the compilation time we can’t determine, 
what way the control will pass. So, we consider that 
fd value is { listen_mode = 2 ∧ fd = listen_socket(); 
listen_mode ≠ 2 ∧ fd = raw_socket()}, where the 
semicolon present disjunction. To build SMT-LIB 
logic formulas for capturing the collection program 
semantics, we have to convert the program to static 
single assignment graph as shown in fig. 3.  
 
Fig. 3. Static Single Assignment for the program 
From SSA graph shown on fig. 3, we make an 
assertion for every each. If first graph fd1 = 0, we 
can create (assert (= fd1 0)). The node "fd4 = Phі  
{ fd3, fd2 }" is a ϕ-function, we built a disjunction 
(or ( = fd4 fd3 ) ( = fd4 fd2 )). Here are two labeled 
edges, so, two implications have to be formed: (=> 
(= listen_mode 2)(= fd2 listen_socket)) and (=> 
(distinct listen_mode 2) (= fd3 raw_socket)). The APIs 




semantics are incorporated and if API has no 
permission provided we confirm that API returns -1. 
Else an assertion, characterizing API from site of the 
model library is imported. For example, for 
listen_socket and raw_socket, the assertion (assert (and 
(> listen_socket 1) (= raw_socket 1))) is imported. 
The main program condition considered above is 
fd > 1. Verifying, if this condition holds is 
considered an aspect of the analysis for this 
program, which is included SMT-LIB formula, to 
characterize the collecting semantics of the program 
by adding the conjunct (< fd4 1). The combined 
SMT-LIB formula was unsatisfyable by the solver in 
[19], which indicates that the program satisfies the 
specification.  
Now, the algorithm for SSA graph program 
converting to SMT-LIB formulas that captures it’s 
collecting semantics, will be described down. Let G 
= 〈N, ε〉 be the SSA program graph. In this graph, 
every node represents a statement in the program. 
The if and loop conditions can be represented here 
as an edge graph labels, and SMT-LIB formulas can 
be generated to capture the program collecting 
semantics using algorithm 1 that formalizes the 
described above intuition.  
Algorithm 1 to convert SSA algorithm into SMT 
algorithm 
for n ∈ N do 
if n is a simple assignment statement VAR = EXP 
then 
Create an assertion (assert (= VAR EXP)) in 
SMT; 
end if 
if n is a assignment statement with API call 
VAR =API 
then 
Create an assertion (assert (= VAR API)); 
end if 
if n is a φ function statement then 
Let v be the variable in this statement and  
the set W be  
the values of this φ 
function; 
Create a disjunction v = wi, where wi ∈ W; 
end if 
if n is a function call statement FUN()  
then 
Create an assertion (assert (= FUN  
FUN_SUMMARY)); 
end if 
for e ∈ E do 
if e is labeled then 
Let n be the node directed by this edge; 
Create a conjunction of implication  
formula e → n; 
end if 
end for 
if The API permission is provided  
then 
Provide the API model as (assert (= API  
API_specification value)); 
else 
Set the API model as -1 (assert (= API -1); 
end if 
Provide the function summary as the function  
return value after the function 
analyzed (assert (=FUN SUMMARY  
FUN return value)). 
end for 
6. Experiments and limitations 
The source code from Android Bluetooth 
ChatServices application was analyzed above. This 
program builds a Bluetooth network platform to 
allow for device to exchange data with other devices 
of Bluetooth. It has three main functionalities: 1) 
searching of Bluetooth devices, 2) pair and connect 
the devices 3) transfer data between these devices. 
The application uses such API calls as: 
BluetoothAdapter.getDefaultAdapter(), 
BluetoothAdapter.getRemoteDevice(address),  
BluetoothSocket and  
BluetoothChatService. 
These API models are provided here which are 
based on the Android Development Documentation. 
For this application we simply consider, that 
application can set up the Bluetooth service and can 
connect to any discovered devices. So, we set up 
BluetoothChatService to return non-null object, and 
in the SMT-specification we model the value of 
API-function as not returned -1. The source code 
analyzed satisfied specification. For this, a few 
Android-free source codes of the applications were 
been downloaded and run the static analysis tool to 
the source code described above. Some possible 
program vulnerabilities were been detected from the 
analysis, are under-mentioned.  
Android SMSPopup: 1) in class 
SmsReceiverService.java there is a false null 
checker for statement. The branch 
if(message.isSms() && message.getMessageClass() 
== MessageClass.CLASS 0) will be never reached, 




2) in class SmsPopupUtils.java the method 
getUnreadSmsCount(Context context) will be never 
called, 3) there is a system command call 
Runtime.getRuntime().exec(commandLine.toArray(
new String [0])).getInputStream()), this statement 
may provide a command injection error. 
openGPStracker: 1) in class Constants.java on 
line 98, there is a hardcoded password, 2) The 
function serializeWaypoints() in GpxCreator.java 
fails to perform a null checker for variable mediaUri 
(line 440), 3) The expression if(startImmidiatly && 
mLoggingState == Constants.STOPPED) (line 563) 
in GPSLoggerService.java is evaluated as true every 
time, the branch else will be never reached. 
OpenSudoku: 1) method update() in 
IMNumpad.java (line 208 and 229) fails to perform 
a null checker for statement, 2) the method 
saveToFile() in FileExportTask. Returns of Java in a 
catch block (line 156) may lead to a lost error of the 
return value. 
In the application Android SMSPopup the 
command injection error has been detected. The 
command statement is an array that comes from 
other function which possibly providing a wrong 
statement. In openGPStracker it is revealed more 
permissions than necessary; that may lead to the 
problem of overprivileged permission. There are 
also detected that the application openGPStracker is 
with hardcoded password.  
A. Limitations 
In the intraprocedural analysis, the constraint system 
includes all the possible variable values and this may 
result in false positives. There are necessary more 
sharp abstract interpretation methods to provide 
some more precise analysis. In the interprocedural 
analysis the summary based functions are modeled 
and this abstraction loses precision and gives out 
false negatives. Another problem of described above 
analysis tool is that it needs developers for external 
XML files creation to specify the right program 
properties; these files are difficult to build.  
7. Conclusions 
All Android programs can communicate to each 
other through system provided mechanisms such as 
files, activities, services, broadcast receivers and 
providers for communications. If developers use one 
of these techniques they have to be sure, that they 
communicate with the right entity, because 
permissions can be easily violate here inadvertently. 
The analysis program framework described in this 
paper can help developers to reveal programming 
errors and the statistic of the permission violations. 
Developers have to understand what permissions 
have to be set up correctly and what basic 
knowledge has to be need in the logic and limited 
solving. The task to help users to set up easily 
constraints and logical errors in programs can be 
accepted for the future work. 
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для java-програм, які містять додатки з безпекою Android 
1,2,3Луцький національний технічний університет, вул. Львівська, 75, Луцьк, 43018, Україна 
E-mails: 1melnyk_v_m@yahoo.com; 2ekaterinamelnik@gmail.com; 3oz_lutsk@mail.ru 
Здійснено поєднання методів статичного аналізу з моделлю дедуктивної перевірки й використанням рішень 
теорії статичної моделі (ТСМ) для створення основи, яка, враховуючи аспект аналізу вихідного коду, 
автоматично створюється за допомогою аналізатора, котрий виводить кінцеву інформацію про цей аспект. 
Аналізатор генерується шляхом перекладу програми для збору семантики з метою викладення формул в 
першому наближенні на основі кількох представлених теорій. Оскільки програма здійснює імпорт пакетів і 
використовує класові методи цих пакетів, вона імпортує семантику викликів API в наближенні першого 
порядку. Аналізатор, використовуючи ці наближення як моделі та їх формули першого порядку, залучає 
поведінку специфікації (його негативність) описаної програми. Рішення SMT-LIB формул розглядається як 
комбінована формула для того, щоб їх «обмежувати» та «розв’язувати». Форма «розв’язку» може 
використовуватися для ідентифікації логічних помилок (безпеки) Java-програм на базі Android. Властивості 
безпеки Android представлено як обмежувальні аналітичні цілі, щоб показати важливість цих обмежень. 
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для java-программ содержащих приложения с безопасностью android 
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Проведено сопоставление методов статического анализа с моделью дедуктивной проверки и использования 
решений теории статической модели (ТСМ) для создания основания, которая, учитывая аспект анализа 
исходного кода, автоматически создается с помощью анализатора, выводящего конечную информацию об этом 
аспекте. Анализатор генерируется путем перевода программы для сбора семантики с целью изложения формул 
в первом приближении на основании нескольких представленных теорий. Так как программа делает импорт 
пакетов и использует классовые методы этих пакетов, она импортирует семантику вызовов API в приближении 
первого порядка. Анализатор, используя эти приближения как модели та их формулы первого порядка, 
включает поведение спецификации (его отрицательность) описанной программы. Решения SMT-LIB формул 
рассматривается как скомбинирована формула для того, чтобы их «ограничивать» и «решать». Форма 
«решения» может использоваться для идентификации логических ошибок (безопасности) Java-программ на 
базе Android. Свойства безопасности Android представлены как ограничивающие аналитические цели, чтобы 
показать важность этих ограничений. 
Ключевые слова: Android-безопасность; Java-программа; программный код; статический анализ; статическая 
теория моделирования 
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